Why atheists are stupid

[Gary Bohn]

"someone3" <glenn.spigel3@btinternet.com> wrote in
news:1164578186.829496.42880@j72g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

> The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
> biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
> explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that
> you think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
> biological mechanism. If the behaviour can be explained by the
> biological mechanism, then what difference would it make whether the
> biological mechanism experienced anything at all?

Let me see if I understand you correctly. You are suggesting that if
behaviour is deterministically controlled by the biological mechanism
then external inputs to the biological mechanism are unneeded. Is this
correct?

If this is the case then you are ignoring the changes to the biological
mechanism in response to the almost infinite combination of values from
external inputs encountered. Biological systems are not static, they
change physically in response to different stimuli. This is especially
true in the plasticity of the human brain.

Our behaviour is determined by the biological mechanism of our brain
which begins with a limited set of built in behavours triggered by
external input - by physical experiences. At this point, the majority of
our behaviours are pretermined by the hard wiring of our brain. However,
as experience accumulates, feedback loops between the inputs and the
outputs (responses) causes the brain to be modified through biological
processes. As the brain is modified, so are the behaviours.

So, yes it does make a difference whether the biological mechanism
experiences anything at all.

--
Gary Bohn

Science rationally modifies a theory to fit evidence, creationism
emotionally modifies evidence to fit a specific interpretation of the
bible.

 

[Inez]

drdach wrote:
> Ye Old One wrote:
> > On 26 Nov 2006 15:22:42 -0800, "drdach"
>
> >
> > >One frequent assertion by atheists made here in TO is that that they
> > >have no"soul" and no other humans have no "soul". Without
> > >delving into the definition of the"soul",
> >
> > You cannot talk about it until you do define it
> >
> > --
> > Bob.
>
> Well, Ye Old Idiot, Boob is still around after all.
>
> Ok fine, what's your definition, lets have it. Spit it out right here
> for all to see.
>
> Oops I forgot, Ye Old Idiot Bob claims he doesnt have a soul and nobody
> else has one either. Right Boob? So you have no definition right bob?

Why would you even want to leave the defining of what you believe in to
people who don't believe in it? You could hardly be satisfied with the
answer.

> Well guess what... scientists are investigating the Soul of APES, and
> you dont.have one.

How embarrasing for him! All the fashionable folks have apes these
days.

 

[eroot@swva.net]

Friar Broccoli wrote:
>

(snip)

>
> I can probably manage 24 hour responses (at least most of the time).
> On the other hand Kermit looks like he might be interested. Since he
> is (in my opinion) both smarter and a better writer than I am, I would
>
> have no problems handing off to him. Either way is fine with me.
>

But Kermit also isn't an atheist. For some reason the OP only wants to
debate with an atheist, which makes no sense.

> > > > Friar Broccoli
> > > > Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
> > > > Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
> > > >
> > > > --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------

Eric Root

 

[Bodega]

someone3 wrote:
> > >
>Now you may ask (if your an atheist) why does
> > > that make you so stupid, that it is hard to think of anything more
> > > stupid?
> > >
Now may I say I be stupidest person in world. Me no want to sit around
on clouds through eternity stringing harps.

Gods will be done.

-- Mike Palmer

 

[Friar Broccoli]

eroot@swva.net wrote:
> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >
>
> (snip)
>
> >
> > I can probably manage 24 hour responses (at least most of the time).
> > On the other hand Kermit looks like he might be interested. Since he
> > is (in my opinion) both smarter and a better writer than I am, I would
> >
> > have no problems handing off to him. Either way is fine with me.
> >
>
> But Kermit also isn't an atheist.

Look at his response to #4 in the following message.

http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/835e62f3e101f440?


For some reason the OP only wants to
> debate with an atheist, which makes no sense.

I think he wanted to debate with an atheist because
he believes self awareness can only arise from the
soul. I suspect he believed he could demonstrate that
awareness could not possibly arise from the material
form. If he could show that, it would make atheism look
unsupportable.

I've made similar mistakes many times in my life.
I think it was worth a try.

>
> > > > > Friar Broccoli
> > > > > Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
> > > > > Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
> > > > >
> > > > > --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------
>
> Eric Root

 

[someone3]

Friar Broccoli wrote:
> someone3 wrote:
> > Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >> someone3 wrote:
> >>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >>>> someone3 wrote:
> >>>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> [preamble cut]
> >>>>
> >>>>>>> I will now expand the challenge, and have included alt.philosophy, and
> >>>>>>> talk.origins.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> This is a new challenge (though reponses that suggest that
> >>>>>>> consciousness might be an evolutionary advantage are still eligible as
> >>>>>>> indicated by the title below). The challenge is for a candidate of
> >>>>>>> atheist persuasion, to enter into a debate titled "Why I think it is
> >>>>>>> plausible that evolution is responsible for our consciousness". Once
> >>>>>>> the debate is entered into, I will restrict myself to only debating
> >>>>>>> with the person that reponded with the first response that attempted to
> >>>>>>> defend the position suggested in the title. They are more than welcome
> >>>>>>> to use any arguments put forward by those not in the debate, if they
> >>>>>>> feel it will help their argument. If anyone knows Professor Dawkins, it
> >>>>>>> would be enlightening for everyone I'm sure, if they could get him
> >>>>>>> on-line to defend this perspective, though it will be on a first come
> >>>>>>> first served basis, though if he was brave enough to see his reputation
> >>>>>>> as anything other than an blasphemous idiot trashed, then I would be
> >>>>>>> more than willing to enter into a simulataneous debate with him. I will
> >>>>>>> wait one hour, to see if there is a response, though if Dawkins were to
> >>>>>>> respond, I'd be happy to debate on-line with him at any time, and in
> >>>>>>> the hope that he somehow gets this message, I will check for a response
> >>>>>>> on a daily basis over the coming week, and we could then arrange a time
> >>>>>>> to debate on-line.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> To address the issue:
> >>>>
> >>>>>> consciousness is advantagious to individuals because it insures
> >>>>>> that they take events (like hitting their fingers with a hammer)
> >>>>>> seriously and spend time reflecting on how to prevent it in the
> >>>>>> future.
> >>>>
> >>>>> So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
> >>>>> brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
> >>>>> enviromental influences?
> >>>>
> >>>> I know this question is one which is being actively researched,
> >>>> so not all (or perhaps any) of the answers to the
> >>>> biological/brain mechinisms are known. There is also the
> >>>> rather thorny question of just what "consciousness" is. For
> >>>> example is it different from self-awareness? How is it
> >>>> measured or defined? Alternatively how can I be certain that
> >>>> other people are really conscious? For example I'm not sure
> >>>> that all the people in my office are actually conscious beings.
> >>>> Do you know of some way of telling?
> >>>>
> >>>> All that said, I don't think I would have any trouble making
> >>>> a reasoned defence of the proposition that conciousness can be
> >>>> explained biologically. Additionally, since my personal take
> >>>> on conciousness is that it is (in part) an effort by organisms to
> >>>> see themselves in their environment then environmental
> >>>> influences are obviously a vital element of the explanation.
> >>>>
> >>>> Does that answer your question?
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
> >>> biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
> >>> explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
> >>> think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> >>> presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
> >>> biological mechanism.
> >>
> >> Correct.
> >>
> >>> If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> >>> then what difference would it make whether the biological
> >>> mechanism experienced anything at all?
> >>
> >> I thought I had addressed this point in my opening statement,
> >> so I will try a restatement in different words.
> >>
> >> An "experience" can (I believe) only be had by a
> >> conscious/aware being. If one is not aware then there is
> >> no-one there to have the experience. Thus, as far as I can
> >> tell, experience and consciousness cannot be separated for
> >> purposes of this discussion.
> >>
> >> The fact of having an experience, is (at least in part) an act
> >> of making something important for the self (another linked
> >> concept). When something is important, it becomes the focus of
> >> mental attention.
> >>
> >> So returning to my "hammer hits my thumb" example. Because I
> >> have made this event important and thus the center of conscious
> >> attention, I begin thinking about what I will need to do to
> >> prevent this important unpleasant event from happening
> >> again. I might for example decide to let my wife hold nails in
> >> the future, or perhaps I will decide to hold them with pliers
> >> or perhaps I will change to holding things together with
> >> tywrap, or whatever.
> >>
> >> Thus consciousness improves survival by improving my responses
> >> to environmental stimuli by helping me focus my mental
> >> attention on "important" events.
> >>
> >>
> >
> > I can understand what you are saying, and obviously something would
> > have to be conscious to have a conscious experience. Though this must
> > not be confused with 'experience' being used in the sense of the
> > hypothalamus (sp?) causing the release of insulin for example, on
> > detecting/experiencing a certain concentration of glucose in the blood
> > (if it indeed does such a thing, a long time since I did biology), or a
> > thermostat making an electrical connection on 'experiencing' a rise in
> > temperature.
> >
> > While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
> > would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
> > how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
> > human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
> > conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
> > be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
> > claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
> > experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
> > conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
> > follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
> > perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting.
>
>
> To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me
> why conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective
> to asking me why you have a subjective experience of
> consciousness. On the other hand, these questions are so tied
> up, one with the other, that they are hard to disentangle, so
> I'll have a go at this new question:
>

No, it's ok you don't because I didn't change the question.

To run you through what has happened, the first question I asked you
was:

"So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
enviromental influences?"

to which you didn't answer, so I asked again:

"The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
biological mechanism."

to which you have replied:

"Correct."

So then I asked:
"If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
experienced anything at all?"

Which you didn't answer so I had to repeat:

"While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting."

Though you seem to have failed to answer again, and tried to blame me
for what exactly I'm not sure, and change the question:

"To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me why
conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective to asking me
why you have a subjective experience of consciousness."

Obviously I haven't my line of questioning, I am asking you the same
question now for the third time.

If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
experienced anything at all?

The question does relate to how consciousness could be useful from an
evolutionary perspective, because if our behaviour can be explained by
the observable biological mechanism, which you have agreed to already,
then how can the unobservable conscious experience be an evolutionary
advantage, if everything is explainable by the observable biological
mechanism (therefore no need to refer to the unobservable conscious
experiences). If you can see, you have already admitted that
consciousness could not be an evolutionary advantage, by saying that
the behaviour could be explained solely with the biological mechanism.

So hopefully you can see the position you are in, did you want to give
up this avenue, as I noticed that when you started out you gave
yourself what you thought might be a potential escape route. Perhaps we
will either answer the question (and there is no answer btw, as you
have said that the behaviour can be explained simply by the mechanism,
which was simply an answer to my first question which I had to repeat).


If you can understand the way it has gone so far, then perhaps you'll
simply try to answer the questions honestly in future instead of
wriggling, and trying to change what I am asking, because it doesn't
confuse me, it's just slightly embarrasing for yourself, as it makes it
look as though you weren't intellectually honest.


>
> Well, first off, it is not obvious to me how an instinct based
> nervous system (which is what you are left with if you don't
> have conciousness) could set priorities in a complex and
> changing environment. Can you tell me how priorities are set
> in complex environments if the self is not aware of anything,
> even of its own existence?
>
> Additionally, there is also a completely different way of
> considering conciousness. Conscious beings consider themselves
> as objects in their environment, just like OTHER external
> objects.
>
> Consider, for example, a Leopard chasing a Gazelle. The Leopard
> needs to predict what the Gazelle is likely to do, so it forms
> mental images of the Gazelle's reactions to various threats, so
> that it can better plan its attack. But the Gazelle/Leopard
> activities are interactive, so the Leopard needs to be able to
> picture ITSELF in the chase, as well as the Gazelle in order
> to make the most efficient moves.
>
> I believe that your SUBJECTIVE conscious experience, which is I
> believe, what you are asking about here; is you looking back at
> yourself, in the same way that you look at other external
> objects.
>
> Now as I was very careful to point out when I started into this
> discussion, I cannot prove that this accounts for your
> subjective experience, but to me it looks like a full
> accounting, at least in principle.
>
> You may have a vague (or even definite) feeling that your
> conscious experience is something more, but I don't believe you
> will be able to tell me what that something is. And I believe
> the reason you won't be able to tell me, is because there is in
> fact nothing more there.
>
> >>> I understand that you have added the caveat, that you reserve
> >>> the right to retreat from this perspective if you find
> >>> yourself unable to defend it, and that is fine.
> >>
> >> I am not sure what perspective you think I would want to
> >> retreat from. My caveats were intended only to point out that
> >> I can not PROVE my case. Making a plausible argument that
> >> consciousness can be explained biologically seems easy.
> >>
> >>
> >>> When the time comes you can explore the perspective that human
> >>> behaviour is not explainable by the observable materialistic
> >>> biological perspective. For now, rather than explore neither,
> >>> let us explore your first potential avenue, you can start to
> >>> do so by answering the above question (obviously if the
> >>> unobservable experience of the biological mechanism did make a
> >>> difference, then human behaviour would not be explainable by
> >>> the observable materialistic biological perspective, and we
> >>> can move straight on to that potential avenue if you wish).
> >>
> >> If you think human behaviour can be explained non biologically,
> >> then how do you explain the effect of drugs (like pot or
> >> whatever) on human behaviour?
> >>
> >
> > Your conscious experience is based upon your neural state. You
> > experience being a human.
>
> I have no idea what this means.
>
> > This is off topic though, the debate is about your
> > perspective, not mine.
>
> Actually this IS part of MY perspective. The reason I accept a
> description of conciousness based on a purely physical
> description is because the body/soul dualist approach is
> logically incoherent.
>
> In addition to the problem of drugs, there is also the problem
> of senility. When people are affected by brain wasting
> deseases they clearly loose conciousness/awareness. This
> should not occur if conciousness is seated in an an independent
> soul.
>
> Clearly therefore the soul, like conciousness, must be seated
> in the body, and be explainable in terms of the physical body.
>
> I see no escape from this logic.
>
> Cordially;
>
> Friar Broccoli
> Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
> Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
>
> --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------

 

[Ye Old One]

On 26 Nov 2006 16:33:04 -0800, "drdach" <drdumb@drdach.com> enriched
this group when s/he wrote:

>
>Ye Old One wrote:
>> On 26 Nov 2006 15:22:42 -0800, "drdach"
>
>>
>> >One frequent assertion by atheists made here in TO is that that they
>> >have no"soul" and no other humans have no "soul". Without
>> >delving into the definition of the"soul",
>>
>> You cannot talk about it until you do define it
>>
>> --
>> Bob.
>
>Well, Ye Old Idiot, Boob is still around after all.
>
>Ok fine, what's your definition, lets have it. Spit it out right here
>for all to see.
>
>Oops I forgot, Ye Old Idiot Bob claims he doesnt have a soul and nobody
>else has one either. Right Boob? So you have no definition right bob?

The soul is a mythical construct invented by primitive man to give him
the hope of something after death. No evidence has ever been found for
a soul. Only someone with a very simple mind would still believe in
the idea of a soul. Guess you have a very simple mind Dr Dumb.
>
>
>Well guess what... scientists are investigating the Soul of APES,

Liar!

> and
>you dont.have one.

There is no such thing as a soul.

> Perhaps you should go to the zoo. You might find
>one there in the monkey cage
>
>regards from [advery removed]

--
Bob.

 

[Friar Broccoli]

someone3 wrote:
> Friar Broccoli wrote:
>> someone3 wrote:
>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
>>>> someone3 wrote:
>>>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
>>>>>> someone3 wrote:
>>>>>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [preamble cut]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I will now expand the challenge, and have included alt.philosophy, and
>>>>>>>>> talk.origins.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is a new challenge (though reponses that suggest that
>>>>>>>>> consciousness might be an evolutionary advantage are still eligible as
>>>>>>>>> indicated by the title below). The challenge is for a candidate of
>>>>>>>>> atheist persuasion, to enter into a debate titled "Why I think it is
>>>>>>>>> plausible that evolution is responsible for our consciousness". Once
>>>>>>>>> the debate is entered into, I will restrict myself to only debating
>>>>>>>>> with the person that reponded with the first response that attempted to
>>>>>>>>> defend the position suggested in the title. They are more than welcome
>>>>>>>>> to use any arguments put forward by those not in the debate, if they
>>>>>>>>> feel it will help their argument. If anyone knows Professor Dawkins, it
>>>>>>>>> would be enlightening for everyone I'm sure, if they could get him
>>>>>>>>> on-line to defend this perspective, though it will be on a first come
>>>>>>>>> first served basis, though if he was brave enough to see his reputation
>>>>>>>>> as anything other than an blasphemous idiot trashed, then I would be
>>>>>>>>> more than willing to enter into a simulataneous debate with him. I will
>>>>>>>>> wait one hour, to see if there is a response, though if Dawkins were to
>>>>>>>>> respond, I'd be happy to debate on-line with him at any time, and in
>>>>>>>>> the hope that he somehow gets this message, I will check for a response
>>>>>>>>> on a daily basis over the coming week, and we could then arrange a time
>>>>>>>>> to debate on-line.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To address the issue:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> consciousness is advantagious to individuals because it insures
>>>>>>>> that they take events (like hitting their fingers with a hammer)
>>>>>>>> seriously and spend time reflecting on how to prevent it in the
>>>>>>>> future.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
>>>>>>> brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
>>>>>>> enviromental influences?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I know this question is one which is being actively researched,
>>>>>> so not all (or perhaps any) of the answers to the
>>>>>> biological/brain mechinisms are known. There is also the
>>>>>> rather thorny question of just what "consciousness" is. For
>>>>>> example is it different from self-awareness? How is it
>>>>>> measured or defined? Alternatively how can I be certain that
>>>>>> other people are really conscious? For example I'm not sure
>>>>>> that all the people in my office are actually conscious beings.
>>>>>> Do you know of some way of telling?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All that said, I don't think I would have any trouble making
>>>>>> a reasoned defence of the proposition that conciousness can be
>>>>>> explained biologically. Additionally, since my personal take
>>>>>> on conciousness is that it is (in part) an effort by organisms to
>>>>>> see themselves in their environment then environmental
>>>>>> influences are obviously a vital element of the explanation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Does that answer your question?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
>>>>> biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
>>>>> explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
>>>>> think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
>>>>> presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
>>>>> biological mechanism.
>>>>
>>>> Correct.
>>>>
>>>>> If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism,
>>>>> then what difference would it make whether the biological
>>>>> mechanism experienced anything at all?
>>>>
>>>> I thought I had addressed this point in my opening statement,
>>>> so I will try a restatement in different words.
>>>>
>>>> An "experience" can (I believe) only be had by a
>>>> conscious/aware being. If one is not aware then there is
>>>> no-one there to have the experience. Thus, as far as I can
>>>> tell, experience and consciousness cannot be separated for
>>>> purposes of this discussion.
>>>>
>>>> The fact of having an experience, is (at least in part) an act
>>>> of making something important for the self (another linked
>>>> concept). When something is important, it becomes the focus of
>>>> mental attention.
>>>>
>>>> So returning to my "hammer hits my thumb" example. Because I
>>>> have made this event important and thus the center of conscious
>>>> attention, I begin thinking about what I will need to do to
>>>> prevent this important unpleasant event from happening
>>>> again. I might for example decide to let my wife hold nails in
>>>> the future, or perhaps I will decide to hold them with pliers
>>>> or perhaps I will change to holding things together with
>>>> tywrap, or whatever.
>>>>
>>>> Thus consciousness improves survival by improving my responses
>>>> to environmental stimuli by helping me focus my mental
>>>> attention on "important" events.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I can understand what you are saying, and obviously something would
>>> have to be conscious to have a conscious experience. Though this must
>>> not be confused with 'experience' being used in the sense of the
>>> hypothalamus (sp?) causing the release of insulin for example, on
>>> detecting/experiencing a certain concentration of glucose in the blood
>>> (if it indeed does such a thing, a long time since I did biology), or a
>>> thermostat making an electrical connection on 'experiencing' a rise in
>>> temperature.
>>>
>>> While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
>>> would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
>>> how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
>>> human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
>>> conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
>>> be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
>>> claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
>>> experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
>>> conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
>>> follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
>>> perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting.
>>
>>
>> To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me
>> why conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective
>> to asking me why you have a subjective experience of
>> consciousness. On the other hand, these questions are so tied
>> up, one with the other, that they are hard to disentangle, so
>> I'll have a go at this new question:
>>
>
> No, it's ok you don't because I didn't change the question.
>
> To run you through what has happened, the first question I asked you
> was:
>
> "So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
> brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
> enviromental influences?"
>
> to which you didn't answer, so I asked again:
>
> "The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
> biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
> explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
> think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
> biological mechanism."
>
> to which you have replied:
>
> "Correct."
>
> So then I asked:
> "If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
> what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
> experienced anything at all?"
>
> Which you didn't answer so I had to repeat:
>
> "While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
> would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
> how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
> human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
> conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
> be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
> claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
> experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
> conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
> follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
> perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting."
>
> Though you seem to have failed to answer again, and tried to blame me
> for what exactly I'm not sure, and change the question:
>
> "To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me why
> conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective to asking me
> why you have a subjective experience of consciousness."
>
> Obviously I haven't my line of questioning, I am asking you the same
> question now for the third time.
>
> If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
> what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
> experienced anything at all?

The "biological mechanism" (that is the complete physical system
including its environment) is sufficient (as far as we can tell)
to explain all behavior. However, a biological system is not a
black box with no internal activity.

Brains are very complex mechanisms that are very active. They
receive and organize millions of stimuli per second. They sort
through the stimuli and focus on and react to the important
stuff sometimes days, weeks, or years after receiving it. Such
complex activity would not (I believe) be possible without a
conscious mind to organize and focus on selected objectives.

Thus CONCIOUSNESS IS PART OF THE BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM, not
something separate.

So the short answer to your question is: If the "biological
mechanism experienced" nothing at all (including not
experiencing conciousness) then it could not engage in complex
activity. For example language and social organisation would (I
believe) be impossible.

So:
No conciousness => No complex activity.

Do you think that is an answer to your question?


>
> The question does relate to how consciousness could be useful from an
> evolutionary perspective, because if our behaviour can be explained by
> the observable biological mechanism, which you have agreed to already,
> then how can the unobservable conscious experience be an evolutionary
> advantage, if everything is explainable by the observable biological
> mechanism (therefore no need to refer to the unobservable conscious
> experiences). If you can see, you have already admitted that
> consciousness could not be an evolutionary advantage, by saying that
> the behaviour could be explained solely with the biological mechanism.
>
> So hopefully you can see the position you are in, did you want to give
> up this avenue, as I noticed that when you started out you gave
> yourself what you thought might be a potential escape route. Perhaps we
> will either answer the question (and there is no answer btw, as you
> have said that the behaviour can be explained simply by the mechanism,
> which was simply an answer to my first question which I had to repeat).
>
>
> If you can understand the way it has gone so far, then perhaps you'll
> simply try to answer the questions honestly in future instead of
> wriggling, and trying to change what I am asking, because it doesn't
> confuse me, it's just slightly embarrasing for yourself, as it makes it
> look as though you weren't intellectually honest.
>
>
>>
>> Well, first off, it is not obvious to me how an instinct based
>> nervous system (which is what you are left with if you don't
>> have conciousness) could set priorities in a complex and
>> changing environment. Can you tell me how priorities are set
>> in complex environments if the self is not aware of anything,
>> even of its own existence?
>>
>> Additionally, there is also a completely different way of
>> considering conciousness. Conscious beings consider themselves
>> as objects in their environment, just like OTHER external
>> objects.
>>
>> Consider, for example, a Leopard chasing a Gazelle. The Leopard
>> needs to predict what the Gazelle is likely to do, so it forms
>> mental images of the Gazelle's reactions to various threats, so
>> that it can better plan its attack. But the Gazelle/Leopard
>> activities are interactive, so the Leopard needs to be able to
>> picture ITSELF in the chase, as well as the Gazelle in order
>> to make the most efficient moves.
>>
>> I believe that your SUBJECTIVE conscious experience, which is I
>> believe, what you are asking about here; is you looking back at
>> yourself, in the same way that you look at other external
>> objects.
>>
>> Now as I was very careful to point out when I started into this
>> discussion, I cannot prove that this accounts for your
>> subjective experience, but to me it looks like a full
>> accounting, at least in principle.
>>
>> You may have a vague (or even definite) feeling that your
>> conscious experience is something more, but I don't believe you
>> will be able to tell me what that something is. And I believe
>> the reason you won't be able to tell me, is because there is in
>> fact nothing more there.
>>
>>>>> I understand that you have added the caveat, that you reserve
>>>>> the right to retreat from this perspective if you find
>>>>> yourself unable to defend it, and that is fine.
>>>>
>>>> I am not sure what perspective you think I would want to
>>>> retreat from. My caveats were intended only to point out that
>>>> I can not PROVE my case. Making a plausible argument that
>>>> consciousness can be explained biologically seems easy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> When the time comes you can explore the perspective that human
>>>>> behaviour is not explainable by the observable materialistic
>>>>> biological perspective. For now, rather than explore neither,
>>>>> let us explore your first potential avenue, you can start to
>>>>> do so by answering the above question (obviously if the
>>>>> unobservable experience of the biological mechanism did make a
>>>>> difference, then human behaviour would not be explainable by
>>>>> the observable materialistic biological perspective, and we
>>>>> can move straight on to that potential avenue if you wish).
>>>>
>>>> If you think human behaviour can be explained non biologically,
>>>> then how do you explain the effect of drugs (like pot or
>>>> whatever) on human behaviour?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Your conscious experience is based upon your neural state. You
>>> experience being a human.
>>
>> I have no idea what this means.
>>
>>> This is off topic though, the debate is about your
>>> perspective, not mine.
>>
>> Actually this IS part of MY perspective. The reason I accept a
>> description of conciousness based on a purely physical
>> description is because the body/soul dualist approach is
>> logically incoherent.
>>
>> In addition to the problem of drugs, there is also the problem
>> of senility. When people are affected by brain wasting
>> deseases they clearly loose conciousness/awareness. This
>> should not occur if conciousness is seated in an an independent
>> soul.
>>
>> Clearly therefore the soul, like conciousness, must be seated
>> in the body, and be explainable in terms of the physical body.
>>
>> I see no escape from this logic.
>>
>> Cordially;
>>
>> Friar Broccoli
>> Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
>> Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
>>
>> --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------

 

[Immortalist]

Bodega wrote:
> someone3 wrote:
> > > >
> >Now you may ask (if your an atheist) why does
> > > > that make you so stupid, that it is hard to think of anything more
> > > > stupid?
> > > >
> Now may I say I be stupidest person in world. Me no want to sit around
> on clouds through eternity stringing harps.
>
> Gods will be done.
>

When you say "God's will be done" do you mean for us to tell you to go
to hell?

> -- Mike Palmer

 

[Don Cates]

On 27 Nov 2006 04:41:02 -0800, "Friar Broccoli" <EliasRK@gmail.com>
posted:

>eroot@swva.net wrote:
>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
>> >
>>
>> (snip)
>>
>> >
>> > I can probably manage 24 hour responses (at least most of the time).
>> > On the other hand Kermit looks like he might be interested. Since he
>> > is (in my opinion) both smarter and a better writer than I am, I would
>> >
>> > have no problems handing off to him. Either way is fine with me.
>> >
>>
>> But Kermit also isn't an atheist.
>
>Look at his response to #4 in the following message.
>
>http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/835e62f3e101f440?
>
>
>For some reason the OP only wants to
>> debate with an atheist, which makes no sense.
>
>I think he wanted to debate with an atheist because
>he believes self awareness can only arise from the
>soul. I suspect he believed he could demonstrate that
>awareness could not possibly arise from the material
>form. If he could show that, it would make atheism look
>unsupportable.
>
>I've made similar mistakes many times in my life.
>I think it was worth a try.
>
It looks to me like he's begging the question. His question assumes
that it is possible to separate the experience of consciousness from
the biological responses associated with it. But that is the position
that he is trying to support. It is not valid logic to assume your
conclusion.

 

[someone3]

Friar Broccoli wrote:
> someone3 wrote:
> > Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >> someone3 wrote:
> >>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >>>> someone3 wrote:
> >>>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >>>>>> someone3 wrote:
> >>>>>>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> [preamble cut]
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I will now expand the challenge, and have included alt.philosophy, and
> >>>>>>>>> talk.origins.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> This is a new challenge (though reponses that suggest that
> >>>>>>>>> consciousness might be an evolutionary advantage are still eligible as
> >>>>>>>>> indicated by the title below). The challenge is for a candidate of
> >>>>>>>>> atheist persuasion, to enter into a debate titled "Why I think it is
> >>>>>>>>> plausible that evolution is responsible for our consciousness". Once
> >>>>>>>>> the debate is entered into, I will restrict myself to only debating
> >>>>>>>>> with the person that reponded with the first response that attempted to
> >>>>>>>>> defend the position suggested in the title. They are more than welcome
> >>>>>>>>> to use any arguments put forward by those not in the debate, if they
> >>>>>>>>> feel it will help their argument. If anyone knows Professor Dawkins, it
> >>>>>>>>> would be enlightening for everyone I'm sure, if they could get him
> >>>>>>>>> on-line to defend this perspective, though it will be on a first come
> >>>>>>>>> first served basis, though if he was brave enough to see his reputation
> >>>>>>>>> as anything other than an blasphemous idiot trashed, then I would be
> >>>>>>>>> more than willing to enter into a simulataneous debate with him. I will
> >>>>>>>>> wait one hour, to see if there is a response, though if Dawkins were to
> >>>>>>>>> respond, I'd be happy to debate on-line with him at any time, and in
> >>>>>>>>> the hope that he somehow gets this message, I will check for a response
> >>>>>>>>> on a daily basis over the coming week, and we could then arrange a time
> >>>>>>>>> to debate on-line.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> To address the issue:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> consciousness is advantagious to individuals because it insures
> >>>>>>>> that they take events (like hitting their fingers with a hammer)
> >>>>>>>> seriously and spend time reflecting on how to prevent it in the
> >>>>>>>> future.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
> >>>>>>> brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
> >>>>>>> enviromental influences?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I know this question is one which is being actively researched,
> >>>>>> so not all (or perhaps any) of the answers to the
> >>>>>> biological/brain mechinisms are known. There is also the
> >>>>>> rather thorny question of just what "consciousness" is. For
> >>>>>> example is it different from self-awareness? How is it
> >>>>>> measured or defined? Alternatively how can I be certain that
> >>>>>> other people are really conscious? For example I'm not sure
> >>>>>> that all the people in my office are actually conscious beings.
> >>>>>> Do you know of some way of telling?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> All that said, I don't think I would have any trouble making
> >>>>>> a reasoned defence of the proposition that conciousness can be
> >>>>>> explained biologically. Additionally, since my personal take
> >>>>>> on conciousness is that it is (in part) an effort by organisms to
> >>>>>> see themselves in their environment then environmental
> >>>>>> influences are obviously a vital element of the explanation.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Does that answer your question?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
> >>>>> biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
> >>>>> explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
> >>>>> think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> >>>>> presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
> >>>>> biological mechanism.
> >>>>
> >>>> Correct.
> >>>>
> >>>>> If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> >>>>> then what difference would it make whether the biological
> >>>>> mechanism experienced anything at all?
> >>>>
> >>>> I thought I had addressed this point in my opening statement,
> >>>> so I will try a restatement in different words.
> >>>>
> >>>> An "experience" can (I believe) only be had by a
> >>>> conscious/aware being. If one is not aware then there is
> >>>> no-one there to have the experience. Thus, as far as I can
> >>>> tell, experience and consciousness cannot be separated for
> >>>> purposes of this discussion.
> >>>>
> >>>> The fact of having an experience, is (at least in part) an act
> >>>> of making something important for the self (another linked
> >>>> concept). When something is important, it becomes the focus of
> >>>> mental attention.
> >>>>
> >>>> So returning to my "hammer hits my thumb" example. Because I
> >>>> have made this event important and thus the center of conscious
> >>>> attention, I begin thinking about what I will need to do to
> >>>> prevent this important unpleasant event from happening
> >>>> again. I might for example decide to let my wife hold nails in
> >>>> the future, or perhaps I will decide to hold them with pliers
> >>>> or perhaps I will change to holding things together with
> >>>> tywrap, or whatever.
> >>>>
> >>>> Thus consciousness improves survival by improving my responses
> >>>> to environmental stimuli by helping me focus my mental
> >>>> attention on "important" events.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> I can understand what you are saying, and obviously something would
> >>> have to be conscious to have a conscious experience. Though this must
> >>> not be confused with 'experience' being used in the sense of the
> >>> hypothalamus (sp?) causing the release of insulin for example, on
> >>> detecting/experiencing a certain concentration of glucose in the blood
> >>> (if it indeed does such a thing, a long time since I did biology), or a
> >>> thermostat making an electrical connection on 'experiencing' a rise in
> >>> temperature.
> >>>
> >>> While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
> >>> would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
> >>> how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
> >>> human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
> >>> conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
> >>> be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
> >>> claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
> >>> experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
> >>> conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
> >>> follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
> >>> perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting.
> >>
> >>
> >> To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me
> >> why conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective
> >> to asking me why you have a subjective experience of
> >> consciousness. On the other hand, these questions are so tied
> >> up, one with the other, that they are hard to disentangle, so
> >> I'll have a go at this new question:
> >>
> >
> > No, it's ok you don't because I didn't change the question.
> >
> > To run you through what has happened, the first question I asked you
> > was:
> >
> > "So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
> > brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
> > enviromental influences?"
> >
> > to which you didn't answer, so I asked again:
> >
> > "The question wasn't about whether consciousness could be explained
> > biologically, the question was whether human behaviour could be
> > explained by the biological mechanism, though as you have said that you
> > think consciousness can be explained by the biological mechanism,
> > presumably you are saying that the behaviour can be explained by the
> > biological mechanism."
> >
> > to which you have replied:
> >
> > "Correct."
> >
> > So then I asked:
> > "If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
> > what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
> > experienced anything at all?"
> >
> > Which you didn't answer so I had to repeat:
> >
> > "While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
> > would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
> > how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
> > human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
> > conscious experiences. For example perhaps you could suggest what might
> > be the difference if hypothetically (because obviously you would
> > claim 'well the biological mechanism does have an associated conscious
> > experience"), the biological mechanism didn't have any associated
> > conscious experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply
> > follow the observable laws of physics and chemistry? If not, then
> > perhaps you could elucidate further what you are suggesting."
> >
> > Though you seem to have failed to answer again, and tried to blame me
> > for what exactly I'm not sure, and change the question:
> >
> > "To me, it looks like you have changed the rules from asking me why
> > conciousness is useful from an evolutionary perspective to asking me
> > why you have a subjective experience of consciousness."
> >
> > Obviously I haven't my line of questioning, I am asking you the same
> > question now for the third time.
> >
> > If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
> > what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
> > experienced anything at all?
>
> The "biological mechanism" (that is the complete physical system
> including its environment) is sufficient (as far as we can tell)
> to explain all behavior. However, a biological system is not a
> black box with no internal activity.
>
> Brains are very complex mechanisms that are very active. They
> receive and organize millions of stimuli per second. They sort
> through the stimuli and focus on and react to the important
> stuff sometimes days, weeks, or years after receiving it. Such
> complex activity would not (I believe) be possible without a
> conscious mind to organize and focus on selected objectives.
>
> Thus CONCIOUSNESS IS PART OF THE BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM, not
> something separate.
>
> So the short answer to your question is: If the "biological
> mechanism experienced" nothing at all (including not
> experiencing conciousness) then it could not engage in complex
> activity. For example language and social organisation would (I
> believe) be impossible.
>
> So:
> No conciousness => No complex activity.
>
> Do you think that is an answer to your question?
>
>

No you have simply avoided answering it again.

It is not a question about whether surrounding environmental influences
are taken into account, as I said in my first question:

"So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
enviromental influences?"

You state: "CONCIOUSNESS IS PART OF THE BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM"

Consciousness though is not a physical thing, it would be an experience
from your perspective (no 'being' seperate from the physical), not an
object. If you are claiming that it is an experience of a biological
mechanism, that's fine. Experiences though aren't observable, they have
to be consciously experienced, as you have pointed out yourself in this
discussion, which is why I said to you previously:

"While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
conscious experiences."

I had previously predicted you would give this type of response
(highlighted in caps below):
"For example perhaps you could suggest what might be the difference if
hypothetically (because obviously you would claim 'WELL THE
BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM DOES HAVE AN ASSOCIATED CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE"),
the biological mechanism didn't have any associated conscious
experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply follow the
observable laws of physics and chemistry?"

Maybe you could actually answer the question, perhaps in terms of your
statement that:
"If the 'biological mechanism experienced' nothing at all (including
not experiencing conciousness) then it could not engage in complex
activity. For example language and social organisation would (I
believe) be impossible."

Though just in terms of not experiencing consciousness, as I have all
ready pointed out that it is important to distinguish between uses of
the term 'experience'.

"I can understand what you are saying, and obviously something would
have to be conscious to have a conscious experience. Though this must
not be confused with 'experience' being used in the sense of the
hypothalamus (sp?) causing the release of insulin for example, on
detecting/experiencing a certain concentration of glucose in the blood
(if it indeed does such a thing, a long time since I did biology), or a
thermostat making an electrical connection on 'experiencing' a rise in
temperature."

So it seems strange that you should have fallen into trying to confuse
the two meanings in your statement (I can't think of any other reason
why you should suggest that the biological mechanism should be
experiencing nothing at all).

So please explain why if the same observable biological mechanism
hypothetically hadn't had any unobservable associated conscious
experience, it wouldn't be capable of language or social organisation
for example.

(I'm not sure whether you are just being intellectually dishonest with
yourself, or attempting to be disingenious in your replies to me, but
you do seem to be highlighting a certain point.)

> >
> > The question does relate to how consciousness could be useful from an
> > evolutionary perspective, because if our behaviour can be explained by
> > the observable biological mechanism, which you have agreed to already,
> > then how can the unobservable conscious experience be an evolutionary
> > advantage, if everything is explainable by the observable biological
> > mechanism (therefore no need to refer to the unobservable conscious
> > experiences). If you can see, you have already admitted that
> > consciousness could not be an evolutionary advantage, by saying that
> > the behaviour could be explained solely with the biological mechanism.
> >
> > So hopefully you can see the position you are in, did you want to give
> > up this avenue, as I noticed that when you started out you gave
> > yourself what you thought might be a potential escape route. Perhaps we
> > will either answer the question (and there is no answer btw, as you
> > have said that the behaviour can be explained simply by the mechanism,
> > which was simply an answer to my first question which I had to repeat).
> >
> >
> > If you can understand the way it has gone so far, then perhaps you'll
> > simply try to answer the questions honestly in future instead of
> > wriggling, and trying to change what I am asking, because it doesn't
> > confuse me, it's just slightly embarrasing for yourself, as it makes it
> > look as though you weren't intellectually honest.
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Well, first off, it is not obvious to me how an instinct based
> >> nervous system (which is what you are left with if you don't
> >> have conciousness) could set priorities in a complex and
> >> changing environment. Can you tell me how priorities are set
> >> in complex environments if the self is not aware of anything,
> >> even of its own existence?
> >>
> >> Additionally, there is also a completely different way of
> >> considering conciousness. Conscious beings consider themselves
> >> as objects in their environment, just like OTHER external
> >> objects.
> >>
> >> Consider, for example, a Leopard chasing a Gazelle. The Leopard
> >> needs to predict what the Gazelle is likely to do, so it forms
> >> mental images of the Gazelle's reactions to various threats, so
> >> that it can better plan its attack. But the Gazelle/Leopard
> >> activities are interactive, so the Leopard needs to be able to
> >> picture ITSELF in the chase, as well as the Gazelle in order
> >> to make the most efficient moves.
> >>
> >> I believe that your SUBJECTIVE conscious experience, which is I
> >> believe, what you are asking about here; is you looking back at
> >> yourself, in the same way that you look at other external
> >> objects.
> >>
> >> Now as I was very careful to point out when I started into this
> >> discussion, I cannot prove that this accounts for your
> >> subjective experience, but to me it looks like a full
> >> accounting, at least in principle.
> >>
> >> You may have a vague (or even definite) feeling that your
> >> conscious experience is something more, but I don't believe you
> >> will be able to tell me what that something is. And I believe
> >> the reason you won't be able to tell me, is because there is in
> >> fact nothing more there.
> >>
> >>>>> I understand that you have added the caveat, that you reserve
> >>>>> the right to retreat from this perspective if you find
> >>>>> yourself unable to defend it, and that is fine.
> >>>>
> >>>> I am not sure what perspective you think I would want to
> >>>> retreat from. My caveats were intended only to point out that
> >>>> I can not PROVE my case. Making a plausible argument that
> >>>> consciousness can be explained biologically seems easy.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> When the time comes you can explore the perspective that human
> >>>>> behaviour is not explainable by the observable materialistic
> >>>>> biological perspective. For now, rather than explore neither,
> >>>>> let us explore your first potential avenue, you can start to
> >>>>> do so by answering the above question (obviously if the
> >>>>> unobservable experience of the biological mechanism did make a
> >>>>> difference, then human behaviour would not be explainable by
> >>>>> the observable materialistic biological perspective, and we
> >>>>> can move straight on to that potential avenue if you wish).
> >>>>
> >>>> If you think human behaviour can be explained non biologically,
> >>>> then how do you explain the effect of drugs (like pot or
> >>>> whatever) on human behaviour?
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Your conscious experience is based upon your neural state. You
> >>> experience being a human.
> >>
> >> I have no idea what this means.
> >>
> >>> This is off topic though, the debate is about your
> >>> perspective, not mine.
> >>
> >> Actually this IS part of MY perspective. The reason I accept a
> >> description of conciousness based on a purely physical
> >> description is because the body/soul dualist approach is
> >> logically incoherent.
> >>
> >> In addition to the problem of drugs, there is also the problem
> >> of senility. When people are affected by brain wasting
> >> deseases they clearly loose conciousness/awareness. This
> >> should not occur if conciousness is seated in an an independent
> >> soul.
> >>
> >> Clearly therefore the soul, like conciousness, must be seated
> >> in the body, and be explainable in terms of the physical body.
> >>
> >> I see no escape from this logic.
> >>
> >> Cordially;
> >>
> >> Friar Broccoli
> >> Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
> >> Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
> >>
> >> --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------

 

[mikegordge@xtra.co.nz]

someone3 wrote:

> biological mechanism. If the behaviour can be explained by the
> biological mechanism, then what difference would it make whether the
> biological mechanism experienced anything at all?


When the wind blows the trees bows, the tree wont bow unless its forced
to, trees snap off in the wind when they cant bow far enough.

Each entity has its nature and each entity acts according to its
nature.

Man must behave as the physical forces of existence around him demand
he behave, if he doesn't behave as the physical world demands he
behave, he will and does perish, or at best, he turns his life into a
matter of chance and misery, you'll find such people in church and
voting for other human beings and silly to control their lives.

Man's behaviour is an effect, man's behaviour has a cause, and that
cause, in the rational mind, is non-contradictory identification and
integration of the physical matter around him.

The man behaving uninfluence by physical force, uninfluenced by
physical matter of existence, is, the irrational man.

He can be called or identified as a mystic, a socialist, a tribalist, a
fascist, a communist etal, he is the man most likely to slam jets into
sky-scrapers, shucks some have even been seen wearing funny looking
hats and woman's dresses and some can be seen wearing upside down
saucers or towels on their heads, some strap bombs to their body and
blow themselves up, which wouldn't bo so bad if they didn't take out
those human beings who know that they ignore the only real existing
means of their behaviour i.e. physical force at their peril.

As to how the brain and mind actually works, that's a matter of science
and science has already gone a good way down this track.

Man has been blaming all sorts of god's for things / for matter of
existence, that he couldn't or cant explain e.g. like how the mind
works, since before his knuckles left the ground, but thank god
(figuratively of course) one by one, slowly but surely the zillion
god's of the mystics' polytheism are dropping stone dead, as man
engages his rational mind, his mind of reason, into solving the real
problems of human survival, e.g. via non-contradicting scientific
knowledge of the physical world around him.


Michael Gordge

 

[Kermit]

eroot@swva.net wrote:
> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> >
>
> (snip)
>
> >
> > I can probably manage 24 hour responses (at least most of the time).
> > On the other hand Kermit looks like he might be interested. Since he
> > is (in my opinion) both smarter and a better writer than I am, I would
> >
> > have no problems handing off to him. Either way is fine with me.
> >

Alas! I also have a spotty record for responding. It is sometimes days,
and often hours, between visits. Enough time for the occasional hit and
run post but I can't be trusted to maintain a dialog. Not that that
stops me from offering my opinions

> But Kermit also isn't an atheist. For some reason the OP only wants to
> debate with an atheist, which makes no sense.

I am atheist, actually. But I can see how one can have spiritual
beliefs for personal reasons without automatically being hostile to
science. Also, I have friends and a son who are theists; when I post I
think of them looking over my shoulder. Doesn't mean I don't lose my
cool sometimes when a particularly obnoxious creationist starts calling
all scientists dishonest and incompetant.

Isn't it bad enough to point out how they wallow in the wealth and
power evolutionary science generates?

>
> > > > > Friar Broccoli
> > > > > Robert Keith Elias, Quebec, Canada Email: EliasRK (of) gmail com
> > > > > Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
> > > > >
> > > > > --------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------
>
> Eric Root

Kermit of the Apes - I speak their language!

 

[Kermit]

someone3 wrote:
> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> > someone3 wrote:
> > > Friar Broccoli wrote:
> > >> someone3 wrote:
> > >>> Friar Broccoli wrote:
> > >>>> someone3 wrote:
<snip>

> > >
> > > If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
> > > what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
> > > experienced anything at all?
> >
> > The "biological mechanism" (that is the complete physical system
> > including its environment) is sufficient (as far as we can tell)
> > to explain all behavior. However, a biological system is not a
> > black box with no internal activity.
> >
> > Brains are very complex mechanisms that are very active. They
> > receive and organize millions of stimuli per second. They sort
> > through the stimuli and focus on and react to the important
> > stuff sometimes days, weeks, or years after receiving it. Such
> > complex activity would not (I believe) be possible without a
> > conscious mind to organize and focus on selected objectives.
> >
> > Thus CONCIOUSNESS IS PART OF THE BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM, not
> > something separate.
> >
> > So the short answer to your question is: If the "biological
> > mechanism experienced" nothing at all (including not
> > experiencing conciousness) then it could not engage in complex
> > activity. For example language and social organisation would (I
> > believe) be impossible.
> >
> > So:
> > No conciousness => No complex activity.
> >
> > Do you think that is an answer to your question?
> >
> >
>
> No you have simply avoided answering it again.
>
> It is not a question about whether surrounding environmental influences
> are taken into account, as I said in my first question:

Sure he answered your question. Allow me to remind you:
"If the behaviour can be explained by the biological mechanism, then
what difference would it make whether the biological mechanism
experienced anything at all?"

You may disagree with this, and I would be interested in any evidence
that supports this assertion, but that was a direct answer to your last
question.

>
> "So is their behaviour explainable by the biological mechanism of the
> brain (or the whole human if you like), and the surrounding
> enviromental influences?"
>
> You state: "CONCIOUSNESS IS PART OF THE BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM"

That is what he claims, and I agree.

>
> Consciousness though is not a physical thing,

That seems to be what you are arguing, yes. Do you have any evidence to
support it?
Allow me to point out that consciousness is never observed apart from a
functioning brain;
that damage or temporary disabling of the brain results in partial or
complete loss of consciousness for the duration; that new tools (like
the PET scan) can see which parts of the brain light up depending on
what kind of thinking is being done, and that different animals have
consciousness whose complexity matches the complexity of their brain.

This is strong circumstantial evidence that consciousness is one of the
things brains do. Why do you think it is not physical?

> it would be an experience
> from your perspective (no 'being' seperate from the physical), not an
> object. If you are claiming that it is an experience of a biological
> mechanism, that's fine. Experiences though aren't observable, they have
> to be consciously experienced, as you have pointed out yourself in this
> discussion, which is why I said to you previously:
>
> "While I understand you wishing to clarify that a conscious experience
> would require consciousness, you have avoided answering the question of
> how the biological mechanism that you are claiming explains the way the
> human functions is effected by the whether it has any associated
> conscious experiences."

We are learning how. How would a consciousness that is not physical
exist, and how would it intereact with the brain? Your question is one
of the central question of psychobiology, but there is no indication
that the answer will be found anywhere outside the (probably) human
brain.

>
> I had previously predicted you would give this type of response
> (highlighted in caps below):
> "For example perhaps you could suggest what might be the difference if
> hypothetically (because obviously you would claim 'WELL THE
> BIOLOGICAL MECHANISM DOES HAVE AN ASSOCIATED CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE"),
> the biological mechanism didn't have any associated conscious
> experience. Wouldn't it still function the same, i.e. simply follow the
> observable laws of physics and chemistry?"

No, he answered it. We make decisions based on our self awareness.
Probably not all, but certainly many. It is clear that consciousness is
important. You may have heard of recent mirror tests in which one
elephant passed, but the other two tested failed. Chimps routinely
pass.

If we were not aware of ourselves, if we were not aware of others, what
would it even mean to think? Even cats have a sense of other, an
ability - however simplistic - to hope and plan.

Why don't you ask what it would be like to have functioning eyes, but
remove the ability to see? Assert that the brain doesn't generate
consciousness, if you like, and present your evidence. But it doesn't
even make sense to speak of a working brain that is not aware. Not at
the human level, certainly.

>
> Maybe you could actually answer the question, perhaps in terms of your
> statement that:
> "If the 'biological mechanism experienced' nothing at all (including
> not experiencing conciousness) then it could not engage in complex
> activity. For example language and social organisation would (I
> believe) be impossible."

That seems to be the answer. What part of it confuses you?

>
> Though just in terms of not experiencing consciousness, as I have all
> ready pointed out that it is important to distinguish between uses of
> the term 'experience'.

Could you give a couple of examples?

>
> "I can understand what you are saying, and obviously something would
> have to be conscious to have a conscious experience. Though this must
> not be confused with 'experience' being used in the sense of the
> hypothalamus (sp?) causing the release of insulin for example, on
> detecting/experiencing a certain concentration of glucose in the blood
> (if it indeed does such a thing, a long time since I did biology), or a
> thermostat making an electrical connection on 'experiencing' a rise in
> temperature."

I'm not sure that this sort of low level reaction in parts of the brain
should be called an experience.

>
> So it seems strange that you should have fallen into trying to confuse
> the two meanings in your statement (I can't think of any other reason
> why you should suggest that the biological mechanism should be
> experiencing nothing at all).

Why not? What else would experience anything - something nonbiological?
Everything that we think, feel, or percieve shows activity in the
brains. There are interactions between discrete areas of the brain that
can be watched in real time.

>
> So please explain why if the same observable biological mechanism
> hypothetically hadn't had any unobservable associated conscious
> experience, it wouldn't be capable of language or social organisation
> for example.

There are times, it's true, when I think that certain creationists are
not conscious, but those are usually the times when it can be argued
they are talking, either.

For instance, your request is rather like asking someone to justify
claiming that a person must contract leg muscles in order to walk. How
can you and I argue over a claim or meaning or interpretaion of data if
we are not aware of ourselves and each other? What does experience mean
if there is no self there?

>
> (I'm not sure whether you are just being intellectually dishonest with
> yourself, or attempting to be disingenious in your replies to me, but
> you do seem to be highlighting a certain point.)

You seem to be asking him to do your work for. Please explain what it
means to think without thoughts, to socially interact with no awareness
of self or other, to remember without experience, or to justify the
claim that the mind is biological activity, when you have offered no
alternative?

Please tell us what you think a mind might be, if not biological. How
does it interact with the body if it's not biological, and why does it
seem so utterly attached to the brain?

<snip>

Kermit

 

[Sonofagunzel]

someone3 wrote: If the behaviour can be explained by the biological
mechanism, then what difference would it make whether the biological
mechanism experienced anything at all?

May I re-express the question so that the Friar knows what question
he's supposed to be answering.

If I understand you, you are asking whether human behavior would be
different if we had no conscious experience of the stimuli that act on
our biological mechanism.

Put another way, if behavior is pre-determined by the laws of physics,
and our reactions therefore essentially automatic and involuntary, what
difference does self-awareness make?

Put yet another way, why don't we experience everything in exactly the
same way as we experience reflexes, or instinct?

Is that a fair summary of the question?

________________________________________


Now for my answer, which you are of course free to ignore.

In my view, conscious experience is the subjective experience or
sensation of the chemical and electrical reactions occurring in our
brain. Decisions feel different to reflexes and instincts because they
are different physiological processes.

The following is pure armchair speculation:

Reflexes have a 1 to 1 relationship between stimulus and reaction. A
stimulus produces a reaction in the brain that causes the body to react
in a certain way.

Instincts have a more complex relationship: I believe instincts
represent a form of equilibrium in the brain that is disturbed by the
brain's reaction to stimuli or more particularly lack thereof (which
may be internal or external). Reactions in the brain the act to restore
the equilibrium, which cause the brain to cause actions by the body,
which produce further stimuli which either get the brain closer to
equilibrium or further away.

Decisions are more complex still. Decisions involve the receipt of
external stimuli (set 1), matching the effect of those stimuli to
previous stimuli (set 2), which produce in the brain the same reactions
as the stimuli immediately following set 2 (set 3), and acting to
restore equilibrium even before stimuli similar to set 3 occur again.
Sometimes there is more than one reaction going on that works to
restore equilibrium, but eventually one dominates and that produces the
subjective sensation of a decision being made. Decision making may
merely be the process of your brain finding the quickest way to
equilibrium. Because different people are born with different brains,
and have had different stimuli acting on them, different people will
decide things differently. The tendency to decide things one way or
the other is controlled by those two factors, and which manifest as
personality traits. The ability to find the quickest way to equlibrium
may manifest as intelligence.

As you add multiple stimuli and a billion years of evolution, you get
increasingly complex systems for doing the above, that do it better and
better. The brain then seeks out not only instinctual equlibrium, but
also equlibriums that represent enjoyment, pleasure, fulfilment,
achievement etc. The intelligence is applied to more than just
survival. The brain becomes better at predicting stimuli based on
based experience, and as that prediction gets better, the actions
produced move from something that is directly related to the goal (eg
hunter-gathering) to something that is far less obviously connected
(agriculture). The goals and thinking becomes abstract.
Consciousness, art, science, religion, invention are born.

These reactions are so complex, even in lower animals, that it is
probably indistinguishable from true free will. Although ultimately
our decisions are governed by physics, the way the physics works in our
brains is governed by who we are and what we have experienced, just
like our free will would be governed by those things.

So the complexity of the physics involved in the brain can be evolved,
create the sensation of consciousness, and account for free will.

 

[drdach]

Grandbank wrote:
> drdach wrote:
> >
> > drdach replies:
> >
> > One frequent assertion by atheists made here in TO is that that they
> > have no"soul" and no other humans have no "soul". Without
> > delving into the definition of the"soul", I would like to bring
> > material from science which supports the existence of the soul. Namely
> > studies of primates which attempt to show whether or not they have a
> > "soul". These methods can be applied to humans as well and are
> > particularly well suited for the study of atheist soul. (if there is
> > one)
> >
> >
>
>
> Perhaps you should delve into the definition of "soul", since you are
> conflating "soul" as used in the non-materialistic or religious sense
> and "consciousness" in the neural activity sense. The article you link
> to uses soul as a colloquial term for consciousness. It does not in
> any fashion suggest a consciousness that transcends the chemistry of
> the brain, which is the meaning of soul that is frequently objected to
> on T.O.. As always, the scientist makes no assertion about
> non-existence. We simply await positive evidence that a claimed entity
> (the soul) actually does exist. Your links aren't even on that topic.
>
>
>
> KP

drdach replies:

Quite to the contrary, scientists such as Daniel Povinelli have been
studying primate minds using scientific methods to discredit the idea
that primates have the same "mind reading" ability of humans. In
other word he is accepting as a presupposition the existence of the
human soul in order to prove that Apes DON'T HAVE ONE. Clive D. L.
Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape " (not
my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.

http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/14338?&print=yes

The following article by Daniel Povinelli was published in The
Economist

ONE of the trademarks of being human is an understanding that others
also have beliefs, intentions and desires. It has been called
mindreading, or a "theory of mind", and it is what allows people to
work together, to manipulate others, and even to deceive each other.
The current belief is that the mindreading abilities of humanity's
closest relatives, the great apes, are not fundamentally different from
those of people; they are simply not as highly developed. But work just
presented to a meeting of the Association for the Study of Animal
Behaviour, at London Zoo, suggests this belief is wrong.

According to Daniel Povinelli of the University of Southwestern
Louisiana, the idea that an ape understands that another ape has any
kind of mental life is an illusion. Their behaviour may seem to mimic
that of people, but it is based on an entirely different understanding
of the world-one that does not involve viewing others as psychological
agents in their own right.
Dr. Povinelli and his colleagues looked at a very simple test of
mindreading, the ability to understand seeing. When a person looks in a
certain direction, children as young as three interpret that movement
of the head or eyes in terms of the person's underlying psychological
state-what the person is attending to, and what he intends to do
next-and act accordingly. They are unlikely, for instance, to make a
gesture towards someone who is not paying attention to them.

To find out whether chimps did the same, Dr Povinelli's team confronted
the animals with two experimenters. By extending an arm through a hole
in a perspex cage towards one or other of the two, the chimp could
expect a reward of an apple or a banana. But in a series of subtle
variations, the experimenters' positions were altered so that only one
of them could see the chimp. One experimenter was blindfolded while the
other wore a blindfold over her mouth; one wore a bucket over her head
while the other did not; one covered her eyes with her hands; one
presented her back to the chimp.

The results were startling. In three out of the four sorts of test, the
chimps made their begging gestures just as frequently to the
experimenter who could not see them as to the one who could.
Occasionally, after receiving no reward from the "unseeing" one, they
would gesture again, as if puzzled by the lack of response. Only in the
case when an experimenter turned her back on the chimps did they stop
gesturing to her.

That raised the possibility that the chimps might be reasoning on the
basis of some kind of postural cue-that a person's frontal aspect was a
better predictor of reward than her back-rather than assessing
line-of-sight. To test this, the two experimenters assumed identical
positions, facing away from the chimp but twisting their bodies to look
back at it over their shoulders. But only one of them actually turned
her head to look at the chimp. The second continued to look away. Once
again, the chimps failed the test, gesturing equally to both.

These findings suggest that chimps are unable to equate seeing with
knowledge in the way that human infants do. But that does not mean they
are stupid. After enough practice, when the "correct" response was
consistently rewarded, the chimps learned that front was better than
back, face was better than back of the head, eyes open was better than
eyes closed. Soon, they were reacting to the eyes just as a young child
might. Their behaviour, however, was based on trial-and-error, not on
an understanding of seeing. And when they were tested again a year
later, they had forgotten this behaviour.

Chimps seem to be able to hoodwink each other, and can follow the gaze
of another chimp or human who has been distracted by something
interesting. But according to Dr Povinelli, it is possible that in
chimps, unlike in humans, those behaviours evolved separately from an
ability to read another's thoughts. So it may be that our closest
relatives do not share our empathy, but are instead "mindblind".

Povinelli concludes that chimps dont have "souls". This scientific
inquiry presupposes the existence in the soul in humans. Here soul is
described in these experiments as those mental abilities which are
tested in chimps and found to be absent, ie ability to read each others
thoughts, empathy, mind reading, in the abilty to understand seeing in
others etc..

regards from www.drdach.com

 

[Grandbank]

drdach wrote:
>
> drdach replies:
>
> Quite to the contrary, scientists such as Daniel Povinelli have been
> studying primate minds using scientific methods to discredit the idea
> that primates have the same "mind reading" ability of humans. In
> other word he is accepting as a presupposition the existence of the
> human soul in order to prove that Apes DON'T HAVE ONE. Clive D. L.
> Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape " (not
> my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
> Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
> for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.
>
> (snip)

....and then quotes:
>
> Povinelli concludes that chimps dont have "souls". This scientific
> inquiry presupposes the existence in the soul in humans. Here soul is
> described in these experiments as those mental abilities which are
> tested in chimps and found to be absent, ie ability to read each others
> thoughts, empathy, mind reading, in the abilty to understand seeing in
> others etc..
>


Jesus H. Christ, no wonder you are an HIV denialist. You have an
almost magical ability to read things and entirely miss their meaning.
Did you note the part above that says " Here soul is described in these
experiments as those mental abilities..."? "Mental abilities". Not
theological entities. Has it entirely escaped your attention that
people use the word soul in very different senses than the one you are
trying to weasel into the discussion?



KP

 

[Free Lunch]

On 27 Nov 2006 16:50:20 -0800, in talk.origins
"Grandbank" <zetetic@shaw.ca> wrote in
<1164675020.335284.162670@n67g2000cwd.googlegroups.com>:
>
>drdach wrote:
>>
>> drdach replies:
>>
>> Quite to the contrary, scientists such as Daniel Povinelli have been
>> studying primate minds using scientific methods to discredit the idea
>> that primates have the same "mind reading" ability of humans. In
>> other word he is accepting as a presupposition the existence of the
>> human soul in order to prove that Apes DON'T HAVE ONE. Clive D. L.
>> Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape " (not
>> my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
>> Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
>> for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.
>>
>> (snip)
>
>...and then quotes:
>>
>> Povinelli concludes that chimps dont have "souls". This scientific
>> inquiry presupposes the existence in the soul in humans. Here soul is
>> described in these experiments as those mental abilities which are
>> tested in chimps and found to be absent, ie ability to read each others
>> thoughts, empathy, mind reading, in the abilty to understand seeing in
>> others etc..
>>
>
>
>Jesus H. Christ, no wonder you are an HIV denialist. You have an
>almost magical ability to read things and entirely miss their meaning.
>Did you note the part above that says " Here soul is described in these
>experiments as those mental abilities..."? "Mental abilities". Not
>theological entities. Has it entirely escaped your attention that
>people use the word soul in very different senses than the one you are
>trying to weasel into the discussion?

But equivocation is such an easy way to lie (without admitting it to
yourself).

 

[RAMathers38@gmail.com]

drdach wrote:
> Grandbank wrote:
> > drdach wrote:
> > >
> > > drdach replies:
> > >
> > > One frequent assertion by atheists made here in TO is that that they
> > > have no"soul" and no other humans have no "soul". Without
> > > delving into the definition of the"soul", I would like to bring
> > > material from science which supports the existence of the soul. Namely
> > > studies of primates which attempt to show whether or not they have a
> > > "soul". These methods can be applied to humans as well and are
> > > particularly well suited for the study of atheist soul. (if there is
> > > one)
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > Perhaps you should delve into the definition of "soul", since you are
> > conflating "soul" as used in the non-materialistic or religious sense
> > and "consciousness" in the neural activity sense. The article you link
> > to uses soul as a colloquial term for consciousness. It does not in
> > any fashion suggest a consciousness that transcends the chemistry of
> > the brain, which is the meaning of soul that is frequently objected to
> > on T.O.. As always, the scientist makes no assertion about
> > non-existence. We simply await positive evidence that a claimed entity
> > (the soul) actually does exist. Your links aren't even on that topic.
> >
> >
> >
> > KP
>
> drdach replies:
>
> Quite to the contrary, scientists such as Daniel Povinelli have been
> studying primate minds using scientific methods to discredit the idea
> that primates have the same "mind reading" ability of humans. In
> other word he is accepting as a presupposition the existence of the
> human soul in order to prove that Apes DON'T HAVE ONE.

See comment about presupposition below.

A caps lock problem?

"Soul" means here: the "ability to read each others thoughts, empathy,
mind reading, in the ability to understand seeing in others, etc."

> Clive D. L.
> Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape " (not
> my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
> Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
> for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.

Again the colloquial term "soul" is employed by Wynne to mean: the
"ability to read each others thoughts, empathy, mind reading, . . . to
understand seeing in others, etc." The research question is do
nonhuman primates have these abilities. It is not a test of the
existance of a "soul" in general it is a test of non human primates
abilities to respond to a self-concept and see this ability in others,
here humans.

There is "no" presupposition made about the souls' existance in humans
in general. Literally thousands of scientific studies document the
"ability to read each others thoughts, empathy, mind reading, . . . to
understand seeing in others, etc." Only severely mentally handicapped
humans don't have the "ability to read each others thoughts, empathy,
mind reading, . . . to understand seeing in others, etc."

You would not be trying to wordsmith the religious concept of soul
would you?

Or do you not understand the historical relevance of why he used the
term "soul." It is not a scientific concept and was not employed by
Povinelli
>
> http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/14338?&print=yes
>
> The following article by Daniel Povinelli was published in The
> Economist
>
> ONE of the trademarks of being human is an understanding that others
> also have beliefs, intentions and desires. It has been called
> mindreading, or a "theory of mind", and it is what allows people to
> work together, to manipulate others, and even to deceive each other.
> The current belief is that the mindreading abilities of humanity's
> closest relatives, the great apes, are not fundamentally different from
> those of people; they are simply not as highly developed. But work just
> presented to a meeting of the Association for the Study of Animal
> Behaviour, at London Zoo, suggests this belief is wrong.
>
> According to Daniel Povinelli of the University of Southwestern
> Louisiana, the idea that an ape understands that another ape has any
> kind of mental life is an illusion. Their behaviour may seem to mimic
> that of people, but it is based on an entirely different understanding
> of the world-one that does not involve viewing others as psychological
> agents in their own right.
> Dr. Povinelli and his colleagues looked at a very simple test of
> mindreading, the ability to understand seeing. When a person looks in a
> certain direction, children as young as three interpret that movement
> of the head or eyes in terms of the person's underlying psychological
> state-what the person is attending to, and what he intends to do
> next-and act accordingly. They are unlikely, for instance, to make a
> gesture towards someone who is not paying attention to them.
>
> To find out whether chimps did the same, Dr Povinelli's team confronted
> the animals with two experimenters. By extending an arm through a hole
> in a perspex cage towards one or other of the two, the chimp could
> expect a reward of an apple or a banana. But in a series of subtle
> variations, the experimenters' positions were altered so that only one
> of them could see the chimp. One experimenter was blindfolded while the
> other wore a blindfold over her mouth; one wore a bucket over her head
> while the other did not; one covered her eyes with her hands; one
> presented her back to the chimp.
>
> The results were startling. In three out of the four sorts of test, the
> chimps made their begging gestures just as frequently to the
> experimenter who could not see them as to the one who could.
> Occasionally, after receiving no reward from the "unseeing" one, they
> would gesture again, as if puzzled by the lack of response. Only in the
> case when an experimenter turned her back on the chimps did they stop
> gesturing to her.
>
> That raised the possibility that the chimps might be reasoning on the
> basis of some kind of postural cue-that a person's frontal aspect was a
> better predictor of reward than her back-rather than assessing
> line-of-sight. To test this, the two experimenters assumed identical
> positions, facing away from the chimp but twisting their bodies to look
> back at it over their shoulders. But only one of them actually turned
> her head to look at the chimp. The second continued to look away. Once
> again, the chimps failed the test, gesturing equally to both.
>
> These findings suggest that chimps are unable to equate seeing with
> knowledge in the way that human infants do. But that does not mean they
> are stupid. After enough practice, when the "correct" response was
> consistently rewarded, the chimps learned that front was better than
> back, face was better than back of the head, eyes open was better than
> eyes closed. Soon, they were reacting to the eyes just as a young child
> might. Their behaviour, however, was based on trial-and-error, not on
> an understanding of seeing. And when they were tested again a year
> later, they had forgotten this behaviour.
>
> Chimps seem to be able to hoodwink each other, and can follow the gaze
> of another chimp or human who has been distracted by something
> interesting. But according to Dr Povinelli, it is possible that in
> chimps, unlike in humans, those behaviours evolved separately from an
> ability to read another's thoughts. So it may be that our closest
> relatives do not share our empathy, but are instead "mindblind".
>
> Povinelli concludes that chimps dont have "souls".

This is clearly misleading, he does not use the term soul. He
iinterested in researching primate behavior and he would never use such
an ambiguous unscientific term. He concluded : Chimps are not able to
"read each others thoughts, [engage in] empathy, [and] mind reading, .
.. . [or] to understand seeing in others, etc."

> This scientific
> inquiry presupposes the existence in the soul in humans.

Again this is incorrect for the reasons noted above.

In short "soul" as employed here as a shorthand concept for the
"ability to read each others thoughts, empathy, mind reading, . . . to
understand seeing in others, etc." and if you want to insist that soul
is a scientific term then it does't say anthing about a divinely
ordained feature of humans. Except maybe that the severely mentally
handicapped are "souless" in the sense used by Wynne and you.

> Here soul is
> described in these experiments as those mental abilities which are
> tested in chimps and found to be absent, ie ability to read each others
> thoughts, empathy, mind reading, in the abilty to understand seeing in
> others etc..
>
> regards from www.drdach.com

You are no better at understanding ethological research than you are at
recognizing "dihydrogen oxide." Go back to your snake oils.

RAM

 

[drdach]

Grandbank wrote:
> drdach wrote:
> >
> > drdach replies:
> >
> > Quite to the contrary, scientists such as Daniel Povinelli have been
> > studying primate minds using scientific methods to discredit the idea
> > that primates have the same "mind reading" ability of humans. In
> > other word he is accepting as a presupposition the existence of the
> > human soul in order to prove that Apes DON'T HAVE ONE. Clive D. L.
> > Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape " (not
> > my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
> > Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
> > for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.
> >
> > (snip)
>
> ...and then quotes:
> >
> > Povinelli concludes that chimps dont have "souls". This scientific
> > inquiry presupposes the existence in the soul in humans. Here soul is
> > described in these experiments as those mental abilities which are
> > tested in chimps and found to be absent, ie ability to read each others
> > thoughts, empathy, mind reading, in the abilty to understand seeing in
> > others etc..
> >
>
>
> Jesus H. Christ, no wonder you are an HIV denialist.

Lets get our definitions straight mr. anonymous web surfer. I have
never denied the existence of the HIV retrovirus which is merely one of
thousands of known retroviruses, none of which cause disease in human
elite controllers or in primates. If you know of any disease caused by
HIV in primates or elite controller humans, please enlighten me and the
readership.

> You have an
> almost magical ability to read things and entirely miss their meaning.
> Did you note the part above that says " Here soul is described in these
> experiments as those mental abilities..."? "Mental abilities".
> Not theological entities.

What theological entities are you referring to here? I was not
referring to any theological entities. What entities do you have in
mind (assuming you have a mind mr anonymous web surfer atheist)

> Has it entirely escaped your attention that
> people use the word soul in very different senses than the one you are
> trying to weasel into the discussion?
>

Ok what is the very different sense you are referring to here mr.
weasel?
Please enlighten the readership of your highness's erudition.

Since you probably have a short memory and forgot,
I will repost the crux of the previous point:

Clive D. L. Wynne uses the soul word in his title "The Soul of the Ape
" (not
my words, they are Clives) American Scientist Volume: 89 Number: 2
Page: 120 . The scientific exercise of examining the mind of an APE
for the presence of a soul presupposes its existence in (some) humans.

This means that the editors of AMERICAN SCIENTIST MAGAZINE approved of
the title which says that scientists are looking for the "soul of an
APE". In order to look for something, you first have to know what
you are looking for. This is a science magazine presupposing the
existence of the human soul. In order to look for one in an APE, you
have to know about it in humans. YES THAT IS CORRECT, mr anonymous
atheist web surfer . cant deny it any more can you...you are all wrung
out like a wet rag.

regards from www.drdach.com